James Duncan’s Web Page

Following today’s missile test, I have had conversations with people comparing the current situation with the Cuban Missile Crisis, and even stating that the US will enter Iraq-style open war with the DPRK. There are issues I have with comparing DPRK/ROK to those conflicts, as there are fundamental differences that make an both an accidental or chosen war far less likely on the Korean peninsula. So…

Reasons Why Neither Side Will Start A Serious Shooting War In Korea

The North Koreans: I will not attempt to analyse the possible motives of the DPRK, other than to avoid the internal collapse of the regime, and therefore of the Juche system. Since every government has survival of that government as a primary concern, this seems reasonable.

The first main reason an accidental war starting is unlikely is the massive amount of landmines on the DMZ, meaning that no units are going to encroach on each other’s territory via land. This route to war is therefore closed off. To do an invasion/incursion, you have to carpet bomb the border to clear a path. This is known by both sides, and so the only situation in which this is likely to be done is all out war. So not the first step then. Assuming they did start doing this, and that any conflict for the DPRK is magically guaranteed conventional, let’s see how this turns out for the DPRK forces.

They have:
20 MiG, and about 8-900 other 70s-80s mainly Soviet planes. It should be noted that the country has a massive oil crisis leading to a likely lack of fuel, and many are likely unmaintained, or have been cannibalised for parts.
1.08 million troops. This is a formidable number, but it should be noted that these men do not possess modern equipment in the main, or more crucially, modern C&C networks. There are shades of the Iraqi Army in Gulf War I here, and they got pasted.
55,000 special ops. These are well trained, well equipped (for task) troops, who do not face massive problems with C&C as they are designed to operate behind enemy lines in a semi-partisan role. These are likely to be a very effective constant irritation, but people doing asymmetrical warfare without support from the local population can only be an irritation, as they cannot shrink into that population to hide.

They would immediately face around half a million ROK troops armed with modern US supplied kit, the 17 thousand US troops that are already in the ROK, the ROK navy, and probable nuclear subs in the area. They would very soon face US troops from the Japanese bases also, and nigh-limitless air cover. While the DPRK has such a massively fortified country (photos on request) that it would be very easy for them to make an invasion costly beyond any reasonable cost for ROK/US, it is by no means certain that they would have the ability to hold the South Korean ground. One of the most crucial things here is the comparative industrial ability to provide ammunition that even *all* of a war-ruined Korea could provide compared to US forces. So, conventional war results in a massive loss, and probably a complete collapse of an already-on-the-deathbed internal economy.

A nuclear conflict also has no gain for them in power terms. Bear in mind that their nukes are the only thing in their locker: the conventional stuff is all somewhat outdated, representing the materiel that the USSR and PRC felt comfortable giving them, and was much the same carefully obsolete stuff the US give to second string allies. We can take it as read that a limited DPRK first nuclear strike of any kind would result in a massive retaliation on all sites where nukes were still suspected (suspected? Maybe just idly considered possible) to be stored, leaving the DPRK with no real assets to prevent further military response. This means they are faced again with a rather binary option of launching all they have, or having most of their nukes blown up within the DPRK. This is much the same dilemma that resulted in Soviet nuclear planning revolving around a full scale nuclear attack or nothing.

The major reason that this is so unpalatable to the DPRK when compared to Soviet military planners is that the Soviets had a chance of knocking out a significant percentage of the US nuclear arsenal. The DPRK has (unbelievably generously) 15 nuclear warheads. With this it can reliably level the ROK, and *might* be able to get a nuke on Japan. At this point it is faced with the US as main adversary, nuclear subs that each carry more warheads then the DPRK’s entire arsenal, and no possibility of strike on that adversary. This means that a real nuclear war results in them being obliterated.

Why the US/ROK won’t start it: We are well aware that the DPRK know that their only real big card is the nuclear issue. This is what they see as their ticket to both continuing aid, and to avoiding invasion. For this reason, there is next to no chance of us attempting to strike at the only targets that we care about, the nuclear sites. The risk of a preventative missile strike being detected and causing the DPRK to launch the threatened missiles is far too high for the payoff. In addition, we would then face the scenario of having started a conflict where the DPRK had another warhead storage point we were unaware of. Also consider that this is highly likely given that DPRK political planners know that they face a massive disadvantage in an air war, and have no practical way to stop an air strike from a B2, for example. Given the massive concentration of troops on the border, we also would face the likely loss of ROK lives numbered in the hundreds of thousands in even a short conventional war. Any US or ROK president has to be aware that this is not likely to be massively loved by the people at home, and neither party wants to be involved in the massive, massive problem that would be administrating the DPRK as an entity even if all military forces on the Northern side were destroyed.

People have said that Cuba was dangerous as there was no easy bright line planners could avoid crossing to prevent conflict, but neglect to note that in Korea, there is. Consider that the only open military conflict since the DMZ was created was the killing of Southern-based soldiers who had entered the DMZ to cut a tree down. This is a highly formalised conflict, with both sides knowing that any major incursion over the DMZ would mean a full scale conflict, and neither having anything to gain. Terrifyingly well-armed as it may be, there is a reason that the DMZ is the most stable wartime border line in history.